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An examination of the technical,
legal, and economic problems related
to the prevention of
occupational disease
and Injury
NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD
HEALTH, WORK, AND ENVIRONMENT rank among the
most important areas of social concern today, and
the workplace is the point where these concerns con-
verge. This article outlines four basic conflicts con-
cerning occupational health and safety, discusses the
nature and dimensions of health and safety problems,
examines the generation of information and its diffu-
sion, and deals briefly wiih some economic issues.
The nature of the conflicts
There. are at least four kinds of conflicts charac-
terizing health and safety in the work environment.
The first is the clashing of self-interests that is char-
acteristic of management-labor relations on many
issues. Fundamentally, the basic conflict in self-
interests stems from management's desire to keep
costs down and to maintain control of the workplace
versus workers' desire to gain the largest possible
package of wages and benefits, job security, and
control. Three characteristics of the industrial rela-
tions system are especially important for occupa-
tional health and safety: (1) By and large, manage-
ment is responsible in both tradition and law for
providing a "safe" workplace. (2) Until recently,
health and safety were not central issues in collective
bargaining. Even when health and safety were at
issue, the Worker was traditionally aware that im-
provements could be attained only if he were willing
to trade off some portion of his wage and benefit
demands for them. (3) Both labor and management
Nicholas A. Ashfo:d is Senior Research Associate at the
Ceuti.r for Policy Alternatives, Massachusetts Institute of
Tech.iology. This article is excerpted from a study com-
missioned by the Ford Foundation entitled, Crisis in the
Workplace: Occupational Disease and Injury, to be pub-
lished ,in November by MIT Press. The views expressed
in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily
those of the Ford Foundation.
Worker health
and safety:
an area
of conflicts
have difficulty balancing off the concrete and imme-
diate costs of health and safetyjiimprovements against
their often indeterminate and long-term benefits.
Short-term and known considerations usually win
out. This often means that actions are taken to limit
injuries, which are dramatic and whose costs are
reflected in immediately perceived pain and in work-
ers' compensation premiums, but that improvements
relating to health, whose benefits are likely to accrue
in the future, are limited.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
is slowly serving to raise the consciousness of both
management and labor.' The mandate to comply
with health and safety standards is causing manage-
ment to internalize costs, in much the same way that
workers' compensation legislation did. The critical
difference is that .the emphasis is now on prevention
related to both health and safety, rather than treat-
ment or compensation for an injury, and manage-
ment and labor now argue. about the nature of safe
and healthfpl work conditions. These new conflicts
thus center on issues that, if resolved, are more likely
to improve workers' health and safety (and produc-
tivity in the long run) than the resolution of conflicts
over who will pay for the harm.
The second kind of conflict derives from an in-
sufficient data base regarding the nature and severity
of health hazards. A good example is the controversy
over the adoption of standards for 14 carcinogens
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA) in the Department of Labor. Establish-
ing "safe levels" for toxic materials on the data
presently available is difficult enough; the chronic
nature of many diseases, including cancer, com-
pounds the problem by making the unequivocal
establishment of causation difficult. In the case of
cancer particularly, wehave not yet settled the de-
bate over whether there is any "safe level" for ex-
posure to a. carcinogen or whether we should adopt
the concept of a "zero threshold" (no permitted
exposure). The lack of a firm data base on the
effects of exposure to toxic materials explains in
part why only three permanent health standards-
those for asbestos, the 14 carcinogens and vinyl
chloride-have been promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Labor, as of this writing. (A standard for
noise exposure is currently in the process of being
issued.)
This problem of .inadequate knowledge raises the
further question of the burden of proof required to
make legal-political decisions. The standard of proof
required for acceptance of a scientific thesis is much
higher than that required by the law. When it comes
to safeguarding rights under the law, a "scintilla of
evidence" may justify legal sanctions, controls, and
even the establishment of liability. The law thus
attempts to make the best decisions on the informa-
tion that exists. Absolute certainty or even consensus
is not always required. What is required is an oppor-
tunity for all the available evidence to come in and
for all parties to be heard. This pervasive principle
in our system of jurisprudence is not fully under-
stood by "pure scientists," nor is it easily accepted
by parties adversely affected as a result of a legal
proceeding. In such situations, demands are some-
times made for "scientific proof" that is not avail-
able. And it is very unlikely that sufficient "scien-
tific proof" will ever be available-or is even pos-
sible-with respect to some occupational health
issues.
A third kind of conflict relates to differences in
perception of what is just or fair in public policy
and what are the appropriate limits to public policy.
The controversies over the Delaney Amendment
concerning the testing of food additives and pro-
posed toxic substances legislation hinge on the ques-
tion: Do we prohibit use or consumption of a ma-
terial until it is proven safe, or do we allow its use
until it is proven harmful? Either course involves
costs and risks to someone-and honest persons can
differ on what is fair.The question of public policy with respect to the
general environment as compared to the work en-
vironment is complicated by differences in the degree
and selectivity of the risk posed. Chemicals that
degenerate in the general environment or are used
in diluted form may present low risks to the general
population and confer important benefits, such as
certain pesticides. Similarly, materials such as
asbestos may save lives as fire retardants or brake
linings. In such cases, the general risks may be low
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and almost randomly distributed, and there is thus
a certain equity in the use of these substances that
gives us comfort. But if a selected group of chemical,
agricultural, or asbestos workers is exposed to
severe health risks, there is a strong argument that
these situations are not equitable, even if more lives
are saved than lost by the continued use of these
materials. The nonrandom selection of those who
bear these extra risks deserves special attention by
both public and private decisionmakers.
The fourth kind of conflict relates to the fact that
various institutions, forces, and mechanisms in our
technological society are not connected very well.
For example, those people and institutions concerned
with problems in the general environment are not
yet interacting adequately with those concerned with
the work environment. A rather vivid example of
this exists in the handling of pesticides. General en-
vironmentalists succeeded in eliminating DDT for
use as a pesticide because it posed serious ecological
dangers to wildlife and to the consumer. These
efforts, resulted in the increased use by farmers of
parathion, which deteriorates in the environment
much faster than DDT. However, parathion may be
very much more harmful than DDT for the workers
who handle it. Because mechanisms did not exist
to coordinate the resolution of problems in the work
environment with those of the general environment,
control of pesticides in the work environment came
very much later. 2
A second serious discontinuity is in the field of
health services, where preventive, medicine is not
tied sufficiently to the treatment establishment.
Occupational health problems can be most effectively
dealt with through the practice of preventive medi-
cine, and preventive medicine is very. underdevel-
oped in the United States. In fact, many professionals
concerned with medical-care delivery systems will
define preventive medicine as merely early detection
of disease, rather than an dlimination of those
hazards that can ultimately cause disease. The dis-
tinction is very important, especially with diseases
whose progress is difficult to reverse, such as cancer.
The growing interest in Health Maintenance Organi-
zations (such as the Kaiser-Permanente Plan) re-
flects mainly the importance of early detection of
disease. Preventive medicine needs a different kind
of mechanism for its institutionalization--one which
emphasizes the reduction of exposure to potentially
harmful substances.
A third example relates to the different languages
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used and different problem areas dealt with by the
various professional interests in the society. General
practitioners know little of occupational medicine.
The industrial hygienist views preventive medicine
differently than does the occupational physician. The
personnel director may not want workers to talk
directly with the plant doctor or industrial hygienist
because management-labor relations are his "prob-
lem area." And finally, the safety professional does
not speak the same language as the health profes-
sional even though it is futile to draw a distinction
between safety and health in many instances.
Consider the example of noise. Noise has been
recognized as a safety problem by safety profes-
sionals, and they have sought to reduce the noise
level of both the workplace and the general environ-
ment to -minimize hearing loss. But the issue of noise
as a stressor and a cocausative factor of disease is
of little, if any, interest to the safety professional.
Each professional therefore chooses to deal with only
some aspects of a problem, and words like "noise"
mean different things to different professionals.
The problems in the work environment are com-
plex and demand both long- and short-term, trans-
disciplinary approaches for their solution. The issues
go far beyond the medical and technical problems
of disease and injury. It is thus futile to place sole
reliance on any single policy instrument to reduce
occupational injury and disease-be it research and
medicine, the law and the regulatory process, or
market incentives.
Nature and dimensions of problems
Safety .Versus Health. Safety hazards are those
aspects of work environments which can cause
burns, electrical shock, cuts, bruises, sprains, broken
bones, and the loss of limbs, eyesight, or hearing.
In general, the harm is usually immediate and some-
times violent, is very often associated with industrial
equipment or the physical environment, and often
involves an employment task that requires care and
training. Such injuries have increased enormously
over the past decade-nearly 29 percent from 1961
to 1970.
Safety professionals insist that the term safety is all-
encompassing and includes health, but their concern
is more with the explosive nature of chemicals than
with their toxicology and more with the effects of
noise on hearing than with its role as a stressor and
cocausative factor of disease. However, to the ex-
tent that the causes of accidents are recognized by
the State workers' compensation system, they do
become a concern for the firm, its insurance carrier,
and its safety professionals.
Typical health hazards include toxic and carcino-
genic chemicals and dusts, often, in combination with
noise, heat, and other forms of stress. Other health
hazards include physical and biological agents. The
interaction of health hazards and the human
organism can occur either through the senses by
absorption through the skin, by ingestion, or by
inhalation. The results of these interactions can be
respiratory disease, heart disease, cancer, neurologi-
cal disorders, systemic poisonings, or a shortening
of life expectancy due to general physiological de-
terioration. The disease or sickness can be acute or
chronic, can require a long latency period to appear
even if the original exposure occurs briefly, and can
be difficult or impossible to diagnose early or with
certainty. (It should also be noted that disease can
give rise to accidents.)
The real world, unfortunately, does not offer iso-
lated hazards. Chemical, physical, biological, and
stress hazards are often found in combination, and
their effects can be not merely additive but intensi-
fied (synergistic). Carbon monoxide and heat,
amphetamines and overcrowding, asbestos and
smoking, and promoters of cancer are all examples
of agents whose effects can be synergistic. Most such
combination effects are probably still to be recog-
nized, and this recognition unfortunately often occurs
after adverse effects are accidentally encountered,
such as'in the case of barbiturates and alcohol.
Unlike safety hazards, the effects of health hazards
may be slow, cumulative, irreversible, and compli-
cated by nonoccupational factors. While an un-
guarded blade in a circular saw may present a severe
and immediate or "imminent" danger, it is often
difficult to perceive the severity or imminent danger
contained in a brief exposure to a potential carcino-
gen that can take years to cause a tumor or death.
However, the probability of dying from cancer may
be just as high as being injured by the saw.
The inability of the Nation's injury reporting sys-
tem. and workers' compensation system to include
occupational disease adequately has contributed to
the failure of society to recognize the severity of
occupational health hazards. The very nature of the
differences between health and safety hazards has
resulted in a pervasive safety bias that has affected
legislation, the setting of standards, enforcement,
manpower development, employer and em'ployee
education, and technology development. This relative
overemphasis on safety has prevented much needed
progress in the more neglected area of occupational
health.
I The safety bias that pervades this field is
especially serious in the case of manpower and is
manifested in a severe imbalance in the mix of
safety versus health professionals and in the type
of facilities available for their training. This imbal-
ance is in large measure attributable to the rational
response of firms and insurance companies to eco-
nomic forces and government regulaions. Workers'
compensation, insofar as it acts as an incentive at
all, primarily influences firms' demands for safety
as opposed to health manpower, as few diseases are
recognized as being of occupational origin for com-
pensation purposes. The Occupational Safety and
Health Act with its emphasis on safety has, if any-
thing, worsened the manpower imbalance, as firms
demand additional safety personnel to comply with
the act and government demands additional safety
personnel to enforce it.
Disease and occupational causation
The Public Health Service estimates 390,000 new
cases of occupational disease annually. Epidemio-
logical analyses of excess mortality among workers
in several industries suggest that as many as 100,000
deaths occur each year as a result of occupational
disease.3 Evidence from the insurance industro indi-
cates that the excess risk of death, in actuarial terms,
is substantial among certain occupational groups.
This excess risk is on the order of magnitude of all
the other risks of death which we face-in other
words,, the probability of death (given such factors
as age, race, and sex)-facing members of certain
hazardous occupations is in some cases greater than
twice the norm for a matched cohort drawn from
the general population.4
Occupational factors may. very well play a far
more significant role than is presently realized in the
causation of the major disease and health problems
which face us. Two million people die every year in
the United States. Only 25 percent of heart disease,
the leading cause of death in the United States (38.7
percent of all deaths or about 750,000 persons a
year)5 is "explained" by- known physiological and
environmental factors, such as overweight, hyper-
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tension, serum cholesterol and cigarette smoking. e
An unknowvn, but quite possibly substantial, propor-
tion of the 75 percent of 'heart disease risk which
is presently unaccounted for could be related to
work and its attendant hazards, particularly stress.
Cancer is the second leading cause of death in
the United States today with an annual toll of
330,000. The incidence of cancer has risen rapidly
with industrialization: in 1900, 3.7 percent of deaths
was attributable to cancer, but by 1968 the propor-
tion of deaths from this cause was 16.5 percent.
In part, improved diagnosis and longer life ex-
pectancy are responsible for this dramatic increase.
Nevertheless, there are indications that the true inci-
dence of cancer has in fact been on the upswing.
Research in the United Kingdom indicates that
more than 80 percent of cancer is of environmental
origin and therefore, theoretically, is preventable.3
This conclusion is based upon the observation that
the variation in cancer incidence rates among geo-
graphic and occupational environments is enormous.
The Health, Education, and Welfare Task Force on
Research Planning in Environmental Health Science
reported that probably more than 90 percent of
malignant neoplasms (cancer) are "induced, main-
tained, or promoted by specific environmental
factors." I
Of the 80 or 90 percent of cancer which could
be environmentally caused, it is not presently known
how much is occupationally related. There seems
to be a general consensus among cancer researchers
and environmentalists that probably one-half of this
figure is complicated by occupational factors. The
experience of chemists, asbestos workers, under-
ground uranium miners-and most recently, rubber
workers handling vinyl chloride--as well as other
occupational groups amply documents the case that
"excess" cancer of various types is indeed occupa-
tionally related.
Since the production of petrochemicals in the
United States has doubled every 5 years since the
end of World War II, the incidence of cancer char-
acterized by long latency periods may be expected
to rise significantly over the next 20 to 30 years.
This expectation coincides with considerable legisla-
tive activity geared towards chemical regulation-
especially of chemical carcinogens.
Chronic diseases of the respiratory system have
been reported with increasing frequency in the
United States and have become major causes of
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death and disability.,, Chronic bronchitis and
emphysema are the fastest growing diseases in the
United States, doubling every 5 years since World
War II, and account for the second highest number
of disabilities under social security. 1 This doubling
rate equals that of the increase of petrochemicals
mentioned earlier.
Much of the respiratory disease which plagues the
worker is also known to be job-related. Both "spe-
cific" diseases such as coal workers' pneumoconiosis
and general diseases such as emphysema and chronic
bronchitis can be of occupational origin. Note that
even if only 5 percent of heart disease, cancer, and
respiratory diseases is in fact occupationally related,
the amount of occupationally caused death would
number 60,000. Tus the Public Health Service
estimate of "as many as 100,000" may not be un-
reasonable.
A study sponsored by the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health that has just been
completed by the University of Washington" indi-
cates that 31 percent of over 1,100 medical condi-
tions found in 908 participants were of probable
occupational origin, with an additional 10 percent
"suggestive history." The probable occupational
disease incidence was 28.4 per hundred workers.
Only 2 percent of this occupational illness was re-
ported on the Employer's Log required to be kept
for the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA)-and only 3 percent was found in
workers' compensation records.
The risk of occupational illness is not shared
equally by all members of the labor force. Miners,
construction and transportation workers, and blue-
collar and lower level supervisory personnel in man-
ufacturing industries experience the bulk of both
occupational disease and injury. Further, the job
illness and injury rate in agriculture is exceeded only
by those in mining and construction.
Occupational health problems are not restricted,
however, to the industrial or agricultural worker.
They affect white-collar workers and corporate
executives as well. Dentists are being studied for the
possible effects of x-radiation, mercury, and anes-
thetics on their having the highest rate of suicide of
any professional group, and a higher incidence of
diseases of the nervous system, leukemia, and
lymphatic malignancies. Operating room nursing
personnel suffer several times the miscarriage rates
of other nurses and give birth to a larger proportion
of children with congenital deformities. Cosmetol-
ogists (beauticians) display excess cancer and
respiratory and cardiac disease. Administrators are
far more likely to develop coronary disease than are
scientists and engineers.
These and numerous other examples suggest that
presently available statistics seriously understate the
enormity of America's occupational health and
safety problem and the degree to which the Nation's
general health problems may be occupational in
origin.
The Information problem
In almost every public policy arena, knowledge
and its transmission as useful information are inade-
quate and imperfect. It is helpful to consider these
problems in terms of the generation of knowledge,
its dissemination, and its utilization.
The generation of knowledge. The systematic re-
searching and establishing of "safe levels" of ex-
posure for every chemical product in commercial
use is simply impossible in any practical sense. First,
there are as many as 13,000 materials of known
toxicity in commercial use today. Second, as noted
above, most human exposure to chemicals is ex-
posure to mixtures, which may lead to multiple
etiology of disease or to synergistic effects, Research
suggests that 5 percent of the possible pairs of known
toxic materials behaves, with adverse synergistic
effects, meaning that there are millions of such pairs
to investigate. (Multiple combinations increase the
numbers astronomically.) Third, the time lag be-
tween exposure of humans to occupational health
hazards and the appearance or diagnosis of chronic
disease is sometimes two decades or more, meaning
that research, to be timely, must be undertaken with
existing populations that have been exposed for long
periods of time (a form of epidemiological study)
or with animals. Finally, the rate of increase of new
substances for which standards must be set is much
greater than the rate.at which we are able to improve
our standard-setting or enforcement ability.
The dissemination of information. Information does
little good if it is not made widely available to
decisionmakers and to parties who bear the conse-
quences of the decisionmakers' actions-and if it
does not redch them in a form they find useful. Un-
equal access to information is a special problem.
Inequality of access-for example, between man-
agement and labor or between large firms and small
ones-creates incentives for special interests to with-
hold or distort potentially damaging (or beneficial)
information. Differential access converts information
into a bargaining advantage for the more knowledge-
able party, and compounds the difficulties of public
and private decisionmakers faced with the problems
of evaluating the merits of a bewildering variety of
conflicting claims. Moreover, the pervasiveness of
patent rights and licensing arrangements, and the
proprietary nature of much of the information re-
garding newly introduced substances and processes
means that the problem of differential access to in-
formation concerning workplace hazards is endemic
to our economic system, not a mere superficial
market imperfection. Although such problems are
serious, much progress can be made by well-known
techniques of training, technical assistance and
publication.
Utilization of information. A great deal of knowledge
has already been generated and fairly widely dis-
seminated that holds promise of easing occupational
health and safety problems, but its utilization has
been painfully slow.
A tragic example of this situation is provided by
the case of America's uranium miners, an excess
number of whom have died or soon will die pre-
maturely from lung cancer of occupational origin.
It has long been known that exposure to airborne
radiation carries greatly increased risk of lung
cancer, and that the airborne radiation to which this
Nation's underground uranium miners were being
exposed was well in excess of levels proven to be
unsafe. It has, furthermore, long been known in
Europe that this hazard can be substantially allevi-
ated by -the simple expedient of installing adequate
ventilation in uranium mines. Failure to utilize this
widely disseminated information has exacted a ter-
rible toll among America's uranium miners.
Another example is the adoption of substitute ma-
terials for asbestos. The. debate surrounding the in-
dustrial use of asbestos has proceeded largely on the
assumption that asbestos was an essential raw ma-
terial without close substitutes for many uses such
as shipbuilding. Given this assumption, the terms of
the debate were confined to the choice of an appro-
priate asbestos exposure standard and the costs of
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meeting it in terms of filtration and ventilation equip-
ment and the like. Yet while this controversy raged,
the Swedish shipbuilding industry had for some time
been using what are thought to be safer substitute
materials in place of asbestos. These materials com-
pletely eliminate the necessity of exposing- shipyard
workers to the hazards of asbestos, at least in the
construction of new ships. It seems clear that we
have many lessons to learn from other countries with
regard to superior technologies for improving the
level of occupational health and safety. An important
objective of public policy' must, therefore, be to
facilitate the technology transfer process among dif-
ferent nations.
Increasing the effective utilization of available in-
formation calls for a strategy combining enforce-
ment, public awareness, information and technical
assistance, and active concern on the part of those
directly affected by workplace hazards.
The overall costs of hazards
The total cost of occupational hazards-in terms
of lost wages, medical expenses, insurance claims,
production delays, lost time of coworkers and equip-
ment damage-was estimated by the National Safety
Council at $15 billion during 1974-approximately
I percent of the Gross National Product. This figure,
moreover, is likely to be a gross understatement of
even the direct costs to the GNP of both occupational
injuries and illness. An estimated 28 million work-
days were lost through absenteeism and restricted
activity during 1973, according to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. This reported figure is equivalent
to a loss of 112,000 man-years of work. The esti-
mate includes not only actual days lost from work
but' also days in which an employee was restricted
from performing all the duties of his permanent job.
It has been estimated that reduction of 1 day per
year in the annual rate of absenteeism among the
U.S. labor force would add $10 billion to the GNP.13
Much disease resulting in absenteeism is probably
occupationally related, although it is not reported
or recognized as such. Thus if unreported occupa-
tional illness is responsible for even 1 additional
day of absence per worker per year, inclusion of the
hidden costs of such occupational hazards would
result in a dotibling of present National Safety Coun-
cil estimates of the cost of occupational illness and
injury. Many of the other costs of chronic occupa-
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tional illness-early death or ietirement, reduced
efficiency, family and community problems-are also
not reflected in the Council's estimates.
The market paradigm
Many policymakers are accustomed to thinking
about the problem of providing a safe and healthful
workplace in terms of the market paradigm. Accord-
ing to this view, the reason the free market results
in too much workplace injury and illness is that
market "signals" or incentives are "wrong" from
society's point of view. Employers, for instance, are
not held financially accountable for the full human
and social consequences of their failure to provide
safe and healthful working conditions. A dispropor-
tionate share of the damage associated with occupa-
tional illness and injury thus befalls working people,
their families, and society at large, without even
directly entering a corporate profit-and-loss state-
ment. As a result, business has insufficient incentive
to improve job health and safety, and the total costs
of production enter neither the price nor the wage
equations. The problem of public policy then be-
comes one of finding ways to make the market more
effective in obtaining the socially desired level of
job-related hazards. This approach suggests that
public policy should be geared toward intervention
in the price system to make it function in such a way
that all prices reflect true social costs and all "ex-
ternalities" are "internalized."
The workers' compensation system is an example
of an attempt to "internalize" costs after the harm
has been done. Job safety became a matter of self-
interest to both management and labor when re-
ducing accidents on the job could reduce insurance
.premiums. (It should be noted again that this system
does not deal adequately with occupational health
problems.)" I
The market phradigm is helpful in determining
the usefulness of market incentives for dealing with
occupational health problems. The imperfections in
the market approach are inherent and severe: First,
the deficiencies in the knowledge of the nature and
severity of health hazards, discussed above, are the
most serious imperfections since market analysis
assumes adequate knowledge of costs and benefits.
The problem of chronic diseases that manifests its
harm [costs] far into the future presents a "discount-
ing" problem for even the most farsighted manage-
ment. This "discounting" problem for future harm
(costs] is paralleled by a discounting problem for
future benefits as well. Even if a firm thought it
profitable in terns of conserving its scarce human
resources to reduce chronic disease, the uncertainty
of future benefits makes it less likely that action
would be taken. Second, there are serious reasons
for questioning the notion that the existing level of
workplace hazards represents working people's free
market "choice" regarding the assumption of job-
related risk. Beyond important informational prob-
lems, a wide variety of other forces-including
social, cultural, psychological and environmental
factors-influence workers' decisions regarding the
assumption of job-related risks. An inability to
assess or relate to low-probability, large-harm con-
tingencies is a behavioral trait common to many-if
not most-individuals. Further, many workers are
conditioned to accept the hazardous nature of cer-
tain jobs and are convinced of the necessity of per-
forming them in order to earn their livelihood.
The pervasiveness of these market imperfections
with regard to occupational health and safety empha-
sizes the importance of social policy and private
initiative in forcing employers to internalize more of
the total costs associated with occupational health
and safety hazards. The workers' compensation sys-
tem rests on incentives (premium payments) that
are keyed to the immediate and relatively undeniable
nature of injuries; such a post hoc approach is not
sufficient when dealing with the more complex matter
of disease--especially those diseases that take dec-
ades to manifest their presence. Thus in the absence
of some form of compulsion through government
standards or through collective bargaining agree-
ments, it is unrealistic to expect individual employers
to assume what they view to be competitively dis-
advantageous costs.
Other economic considerations
Attempts to diminish occupational hazards are
often complicated by other kinds of economic prob-
lems, not necessarily identifiable as market imper,
fections. Safe conditions are often more expensive
to achieve for smaller firms than for larger ones
since the cheapest control technologies often require
a minimum size that is larger than the operations
of many production units. Also, these smaller firms
may often find it difficult to locate and pay for the
expert advice or information they may require.
It has been widely noted that the most profitable
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firms in an industry are opically also the safest. This
may of course be explained by many factors, such
as better management .(for both -production and
safety), the utilization of longer time horizons over
which to evaluate the investment in good safety
practices, and better access to information and ex-
pertise. The converse of this observation is that many
firms with clear health and safety problems-often
the ones with the worst health and safety problems
-may also be economically marginal. Such firms
are often found in highly competitive industries and
are under constant threat of failure. When these
marginal firms have larger competitors with sub-
stantial reserves or foreign competitors hot forced to
internalize the costs of health and safety, they may
be faced with a choice between hazardous working
conditions and bankruptcy.
The costs of providing a safe and healthful work-
place may initially be high, especially if modification
of existing facilities occurs, and the marginal pro-
ducer may be forced out of business. But it is not
clear that the smaller or marginal firm will always
be forced out of business. The smaller firm's rela-
tively smaller investment in capital equipment, closer
employer-employee relations, and greater ease of
relocation and job redesign may offset the advan-
tages of economies of scale and large reserve funds
of the larger firm. Furthermore, in many cases, the
workplace can be made safer and healthier by edu-
cation and management-labor cooperation, with
little capital expenditure for new equipment or ex-
pensive substitute materials. In such cases, the size
or marginal nature of the firm need not be a reason
for ignoring workplace hazards.
Critical differences in incentives mayexist at vari-
ous levels within a firm. Top management, for
instance, may believe in principle that it is consistent
with the longrun economic interest of the firm to
adopt good health and safety practices, but it may
judge the short-run performance of its middle man-
agement by production criteria that result in disease
-and injury being higher than top management
intends.
In the short run the costs of complying with the
Occupational Safety and Health Act will be high
and unequal in different industries, and severe pres-
sures to resist the enforcement of the legislation will
arise. However, if enforcement persists and other
activities to facilitate adjustment are pursued ag-
gressively, the longer run should see an encourage-
ment of new technology, substitute materials, and
redesigned jobs that should result in higher total
U.S. productivity, decreased worker absenteeism, and
improved job health and safety.
Implications for international competition
Although the percentage of the U.S. GNP that
depends on foreign trade is much smaller than that
for Western European countries, more concern has
been expressed by business groups here than abroad
over the effects of occupational health and safety
legislation on the Nation's international competitive
posture.
Ironically, if imposing strict occupational health
and safety legislation raises the price of American
products to the point we import from abroad, we
are then in fact exporting disease and injury. Fur-
ther, multinational companies may locate a produc-
tion site in a particular country because the occupa-
tional health and safety of a worker is less empha-
sized there and hence the product of his work is
cheaper. We are thus exporting jobs, albeit dangerous
ones. (We could of course levy an import tax on
all unsafely produced goods.) This problem is pre-
cisely why many European nations are moving in
the direction of establishing international standards
and work practices for occupational health and
safety. If the United States seeks to keep its own
standards below those of other advanced nations,
it will not be avoiding a competitive disadvantage,
but rather capturing a competitive advantage.
Nor is it clear that environmental controls will
severely affect America's competitive position. A re-
port for the National Commission of Materials
Policy from the National Academies of Science and
Engineering examines the impact of general environ-
mental controls:
There are only a few econometric estimates of the
impact of environmental control on the short-term
balance of payments and level of aggregate income.
One, using an econometric model of the U.S. econ-
omy and projected future American EC measures
(assuming other nations do not follow suit), emerges
with the following results: Over the 1972-80 period,
pollution control and compensatory macroeconomic
policy measures are expected to raise the U.S. un-
employment rate by 0.3 percent, raise the average
annual rate of inflation by 0.26 percent, reduce fixed
investment not related to pollution control by an
average of $2.3 billion annually, and exert a negative
impact on the U.S. balance of trade in the amount
of $1.9 billion (Council- on Environmental Quality
1972). If, on the other hand, pollution control costs
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are 50 percent higher than current estimates, or
standards are raised correspondingly, the average
annual 1980 negative trade balance effect is esti-
mated to be in the neighborhood of $3.2 billion or
6-7% of current level of exports. [Emphasis added.]
The meager empirical evidence available at this
time suggests the balance of payments, employment,
and national income effects resulting from domestic
environmental controls are likely to be relatively
small for the United States. This is true even if the
trend toward indirect subsidization is reversed toward
a full "polluter pays" principle. Thus, a tentative
conclusion is that the aggregate impact of domestic
environmental controls should not be a matter of
deep concern for policymakers. Of more crucial
importance are the short-term impacts on particular
firms and industries. Substantial additional research
is needed on these questions. 15
Moreover, the President's Sdience Advisory Com-
mittee takes into account the expectation that for-
eign rivals would be adopting similar regulating
controls.
Thus, the notion that the United States would
suffer a severe competitive disadvantage interna-
tionally if it enforces strict environmental controls
in the occupational health and safety area is open
to question. Such enforcement may, however,
change the mix of small and large firms in a hazard-
ous industry, with some smaller and marginal firms
disappearing. It would seem, then, that compitition
in international markets does not appear to create
an economic imperative for relaxing the provisions
of occupational health and safety legislation. What
seems to emerge is an imperative to adopt uniform
international standards and practices and to devise
special forms of assistance to smaller or marginal
producers. 0
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